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Abstract 
Drawing upon a case study of regional transit in Denver, Colorado, this paper describes and 
accounts for the emergence of the global infrastructure public-private partnership (GIP3) as a 
novel extra-territorial mechanism for financing and delivering transportation infrastructure 
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projects across large metropolitan regions in the United States (US). Unlike traditional 
locally-funded public-private partnerships, a GIP3 involves a global (i.e. extra-territorial) 
consortium of private sector construction firms and investors which enters into a long-term 
contract with a regional public agency to finance, operate, maintain and deliver strategic 
investments in transportation infrastructure. In 2004, Denver region voters approved a sales 
tax increase to fund the Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD)’s $4.7 billion 
FasTracks programme, a 122-mile extension of light and commuter rail along six corridors.  
Faced with a shortfall in regional funding, the Denver RTD subsequently entered into a 
contract with a GIP3 consortium to finance and deliver the Eagle P3 project, a major 
extension of the FasTracks system to Denver International Airport. The paper argues that 
future research on GIP3 contractual agreements needs to consider the local control of 
infrastructure assets and the integrity of supporting regional collaborative governance 
arrangements.  
Key words: public-private partnerships, infrastructure finance, regional transit, collective 
provision, Denver, USA 
 
Introduction 
In the United States (US), fiscal austerity continues to pose a number of challenges 
for those public agencies responsible for funding, financing and delivering regional 
transportation infrastructure projects, such as light and commuter rail systems. A well-known 
problem is the disparity between metropolitan-wide demands for infrastructure and the 
capacity of local jurisdictions to raise sufficient revenue to fund, finance and deliver the 
required infrastructure at little or no additional cost for local taxpayers.  Solutions to the so-
called metropolitan fiscal disparity issue hitherto have involved inter alia the creation of 
regional special purpose districts, metropolitan-wide revenue-sharing agreements, and greater 
regional collaboration across formal municipal, county and, increasingly, metropolitan 
political boundaries (Bish, 1971; Ostrom, 1990; Hall and Jonas, 2014; Wachsmuth, 2015). 
Faced, however, with mounting shortfalls in local funding, and federal government 
retrenchment from capital investments, regional agencies are now turning to extra-territorial 
(i.e. global) institutional mechanisms in order to raise additional capital and arrange new 
financing terms for infrastructure projects.  This paper offers a fresh perspective on such 
developments by describing and explaining the emergence of the global infrastructure public-
private partnership (GIP3) as a novel extra-territorial mechanism for funding, financing and 
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delivering transportation infrastructure projects across large and growing metropolitan 
regions in the US.  
A GIP3 is defined as a private consortium of international construction firms, 
operators and investors which enters into a long-term contract (typically lasting more than 
twenty years) with a regional public agency to finance, deliver, operate and maintain a major 
infrastructure project. Unlike traditional public-private partnership (P3) arrangements which, 
in the US, have almost exclusively relied upon local funding, a GIP3 raises a significant 
portion of project capital in global equity and bond markets. Whereas the regional agency 
potentially benefits by resolving short-term cash-flow problems, reduced public borrowing 
costs, spreading financing, construction, and operating risks, and delivering the service or 
infrastructure on time and at lower cost, local contractors, suppliers and other local 
businesses profit from subcontracting arrangements with the GIP3 consortium.  
Local and regional authorities in many countries are familiar with private finance 
initiatives and other P3 mechanisms used to finance and deliver a variety of infrastructure 
projects, ranging from hospitals to water systems and toll roads (Allen and Pryke, 2013, 
O’Neill, 2013). Although public agencies in the US are likewise turning to P3s, major urban 
infrastructure projects are heavily dependent upon local funding from inter alia sales taxes, 
fees and user charges, as well as voter-approved municipal and revenue bonds (Sbragia, 
1996). Such reliance upon local sources of funding, in turn, underpins the problem of local 
dependence (Cox and Mair, 1988), which remains an enduring feature of the politics of 
metropolitan economic development in the US (Cox, 2011). Efforts to mitigate the problem 
hitherto have involved political lobbying on behalf of developers, local governments and 
other members of the metropolitan growth coalition for additional regional, state and/or 
federal funding (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Nonetheless, confronted with extreme austerity 
measures and reduced federal funding for infrastructure, municipal governments throughout 
the US are entering into all sorts of novel institutional relationships with the private sector in 
order to raise private capital for public infrastructure projects (Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011; 
Hall and Jonas, 2014). For their part, regional transit officials are turning to the new 
generation of GIP3s in order to cover a growing deficit in the local and regional funding of 
collective infrastructure provision.  
At the same time, the US federal government – notably the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) – is encouraging regional transportation agencies to experiment with 
new P3 arrangements, which are designed to reallocate risk from the public to the private 
sector, as a condition of a federal grant funding agreement. In this context, a GIP3 represents 
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an integrated project funding, financing and delivery mechanism rather than a pure form of 
infrastructure privatisation. In order to guarantee project delivery and the integrity of local 
assets (e.g. tracks, equipment, buildings, etc.), GIP3 contractual agreements typically include 
provisions around the future control of such assets should the consortium fail to deliver. The 
precise terms of such a contract, in turn, could play a significant part in mitigating the 
problem of local dependence, averting potential opposition from local voters, and 
strengthening existing collaborations between local governments, politicians and 
metropolitan growth coalitions, all of whom are dependent to a greater or lesser degree upon 
the efficient provision of infrastructure. In these respects, knowledge of the circumstances 
surrounding a contractual agreement between a GIP3 and a regional public authority could 
shed light on a new and potentially significant trajectory in the territorial politics of collective 
provision in the US (cf. Jonas et al. 2010). 
With these considerations in mind, this paper examines a novel GIP3 arrangement 
created to fund, finance and deliver additional extensions to regional transportation 
infrastructure in the Metro Denver region in Colorado. In 2004, Denver area residents voted 
to expand the existing regional mass transit system operated by the Denver Regional 
Transportation District (RTD). The $4.7 billion FasTracks programme involved a 122-mile 
extension of light and commuter rail along six corridors in the Metro Denver region.  
However, confronting a subsequent shortfall in regional funding, the Denver RTD entered 
into a contractual agreement with a private sector-led global consortium to deliver the Eagle 
P3 project, a major extension of rail services from downtown Denver to Denver International 
Airport and nearby suburbs. Denver RTD had previous experience with private sector 
involvement through its outsourcing of some bus services to private companies as well as its 
design-build P3 for the Southeast Corridor light rail line completed in 2006.  Still, the 
decision to expand private sector involvement in the Eagle P3 project represented a major 
step change in its infrastructure provision. Crucial factors shaping the Eagle P3 contractual 
agreement were the desire to protect local control of infrastructure assets and preserve the 
territorial integrity of Metro Denver’s collaborative approach to regional economic 
development, both of which were threatened by the precarious fiscal predicament of the 
FasTracks project.  
The paper reports the findings of a study of new transit P3s in Denver conducted 
between 2010 and 2017. The main aims of the study were to: (1) evaluate the effectiveness of 
new transit P3 arrangements in resolving a regional crisis in infrastructure funding; and (2) 
assess the impact of such arrangements on Denver’s existing model of collaborative regional 
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governance. The empirical research involved an analysis of secondary sources, including 
published public documents and metropolitan newspaper articles, as well as face-to-face 
interviews conducted with twenty stakeholders in Metro Denver which were designed to 
solicit contrasting views on new transit P3 arrangements.i Potential interviewees were 
identified on the basis of local knowledge, stakeholder referrals, and secondary sources. As 
such they were not representative of the wider Denver region population but nevertheless 
included a broad cross-section of public and private sector actors involved in the planning, 
financing, operation and/or delivery of regional transportation projects in Metro Denver. We 
conducted six further interviews with regional transit officials in other US cities embarking 
on major transit system extensions and representatives of global infrastructure investment 
banks based in London, United Kingdom. The latter provided an international perspective on 
the role of GIP3s in financing transportation infrastructure projects in the US and worldwide. 
The first section of the paper documents the emergence of new types of P3 
arrangements designed to fund, finance and deliver regional transportation infrastructure 
projects in the US. Subsequent sections examine the central role played by a GIP3 in funding, 
financing and delivering the Eagle P3 project in Metro Denver, one of the first examples of 
such an arrangement and the largest rail transit public-private partnership in recent US 
history. The analysis highlights the role of local dependence in shaping the negotiation of a 
long-term contractual arrangement between the GIP3, the Denver RTD and regional 
stakeholders. Key points of contention and negotiation centred around the local control of 
infrastructure assets and the long-term integrity of Denver’s approach to regional 
collaboration. The paper concludes with some wider reflections on the changing landscape of 
global infrastructure financing and raises questions for future research into the role of the 
GIP3 in the new territorial politics of collective infrastructure provision.  
 
The role of P3s in financing transportation infrastructure  
Often closely associated with the rise and spread of neoliberal urbanism in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Jessop et al. 1999), innovative P3 mechanisms have been widely used over 
subsequent decades to deliver transit and other urban infrastructure projects throughout the 
world (Mandri-Perrott, 2009; Torrance, 2008). If local entrepreneurialism is deeply ingrained 
in the institutions and financial practices of American local government (Sbragia, 1996), the 
US is nevertheless a relative latecomer to the global P3 scene. Since at least the early 
nineteenth century, US local governments have raised capital for infrastructure projects, such 
as canals, roads and sewerage systems, primarily from the sale of municipal and revenue 
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bonds. Issued against the promise of future revenue from local taxes and service charges, 
these bonds are, in effect, legal agreements between local public and private sector interests 
lasting the lifetime of the bond issue, which can be up to thirty years. Given such long-term 
local commitments, banks and other locally dependent business interests have a substantial 
material stake in the further expansion of the local economy and tax base (Cox and Mair, 
1988).  
In order to realise future gains from their investments, locally dependent businesses 
strive to nurture enduring local social relationships. When it comes to local investments in 
infrastructure, local knowledge is a key consideration. For example, access to detailed 
knowledge of local contractual arrangements governing the availability and supply of 
necessary social and transportation infrastructure (e.g. water, sewerage, etc.) at specific 
locations across a metropolitan area can be critical to the realisation of local interests in urban 
development (Cox and Jonas, 1993). An additional consideration is how to secure local voter 
approval for a proposed bond issue. Failing that, P3 mechanisms such as Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF) are now widely used to raise capital for infrastructure projects without the 
need to resort to the ballot box (Hall and Jonas, 2014). In TIF schemes, a redevelopment 
agency accrues revenue (or tax increment) needed to pay for infrastructure from the increase 
in local property taxes that results directly from a major redevelopment project, such as a 
regional transit hub (Jonas and McCarthy, 2010).   
Given intense territorial competition for inward investment, the landscape of urban 
infrastructure finance continues to evolve as public authorities look to other P3 mechanisms 
besides TIF in order to finance and deliver investments in regional transportation 
infrastructure. Between 1985 and 2011, 377 infrastructure projects in the US were delivered 
by the new generation of transportation P3 arrangements (Istrate and Puentes, 2011). In a 
survey of thirty-two US states, Papajohn et al. (2011: 127) found that twenty-five US states 
had already adopted or were planning to adopt P3s, while only seven did not plan to pursue 
them. The number of rail transit P3s in the US is small but growing (Thomas, 2014; Mandri-
Perrott, 2009).  Between 1989 and 2011, eighty-one per cent of transportation P3s in the US 
involved highways, bridges and tunnels, whereas nineteen per cent were for rail projects 
(Istrate and Puentes, 2011).     
Recent growth in P3 infrastructure projects in the US is sustained by claims that the 
latest generation of P3 financing arrangements can deliver such projects faster and at a lower 
price than more conventional forms of public-sector borrowing.  For example, in the United 
Kingdom (UK) the National Audit Office found that only twenty-four per cent of P3 projects 
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were not completed on time compared to seventy per cent of projects delivered by traditional 
methods, and budgets were exceeded in twenty-two per cent of P3s versus seventy-three per 
cent of traditional procurements (NAO, 2003).  Proponents claim that P3 projects benefit 
from technological expertise available from the private sector especially during the 
construction and operation phases of a project. They further argue that P3 innovation leads to 
a better quality infrastructure product at a lower cost (Thomas, 2014: 6; Papajohn et al., 2011, 
pp. 130-131; interview, infrastructure financier, London, May 2016).  During P3 contract 
negotiations, the public sector can stipulate what is required from the project and impose 
penalties on the private consortium at any stage of a project if output specifications are not 
achieved (Lam and Javed, 2015). Moreover, P3s increase the availability of capital funds to a 
public agency, allowing it to finance an infrastructure project over a longer time-period and 
re-allocate risk to the private sector accordingly. Papajohn et al. (2011) found that in more 
than half of the US states P3s were implemented because of financing reasons, while in 
twenty-one per cent of cases P3s were set up for cost-saving reasons.  However, they further 
found that risk transfer was not a primary reason for setting up a P3 even though risk 
allocation remains a crucial component of contractual negotiations.   
Although the use of private equity to finance and deliver transportation P3 projects 
is on the rise, the US nevertheless continues to lag behind other countries. Indeed, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has described the US 
infrastructure market as “immature” in comparison to that of other OECD states (cited in 
Roumeliotis, 2012). Factors highlighted by the OECD include: the territorially fragmented 
system of public administration in the US; competition between cities, counties and states for 
private investment; a complex state-by-state public procurement regime; and a dearth of state 
and federal subsidies for major infrastructure projects. The historically strong federal-state 
partnership in overseeing transportation infrastructure provision, such as the 90 per cent 
federal funding for the construction of the Interstate Highway System, has left little room for 
global private equity investors.  Taken together, these factors necessitate of such investors “a 
more pro-active approach to securing mandates on the ground” (cited in Caon, 2014).  
In the meantime, the widespread use of P3s to deliver major public infrastructure 
projects has become a focus of critical academic scrutiny and growing public skepticism. 
Recent studies suggest that the initial transaction costs are much higher for a P3 compared to 
conventional public sector-funded projects because of the need to hire expensive legal 
expertise to negotiate increasingly complicated contractual agreements (Valila, 2005).  Critics 
have further concerns about the loss of public accountability and transparency when the 
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private sector takes over the operation of a major public asset (Siemiatycki, 2006; Forrer et 
al., 2010).  Siemiatycki (2006) analysed the Richmond-Airport-Vancouver (RAV) urban rail 
line P3 in Canada and found that it did not deliver on expected benefits, such as reducing 
costs and encouraging innovation.  Analyses revealed that the private interest used two 
pension funds largely composed of public employee retirement savings as investments for the 
project (Palmer, 2005; Schiller and Kenworthy, 2018).  Over the longer term, there were 
frequent disagreements between partners over concession agreements, resulting in lawsuits 
and, eventually, the public sector taking over management of major infrastructure assets. In a 
follow-up comparative study, Siemiatycki (2009) found that, while P3s were effective at 
raising funds for new facilities and transferring some financial risks to the private sector, 
there was often a lack of meaningful community engagement in project planning.  Further 
studies highlight the recent experiences of US toll roads and highway infrastructure projects, 
some of which have failed and/or returned to public management (van der Hilst, 2012; 
Reinhardt and Utt, 2012). Such failures feed into growing public skepticism about the long-
term sustainability of P3 arrangements. 
Not only do experiences and outcomes vary between countries but also, within the 
US, P3 arrangements differ markedly from sector to sector, city to city, and project to project. 
Design-build (DB) and design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) are the two most common P3 
models, with DB contracts amounting to sixty-two per cent of the total transport P3s active in 
the US from 1989 to 2011 (Thomas, 2014).  In the DB model, the public agency develops 
certain performance specifications for the project but the detailed design is the responsibility 
of the private consortium, enabling it to exploit economies and reduce project costs.  DBOM 
adds operations and maintenance responsibilities to the contract, which is usually for a period 
of fifteen or more years. A full design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) delivery 
method can further transfer financial risk to the private sector as well as generate project life-
cycle cost savings (Thomas, 2014). Table 1 provides examples of some of the largest 
(measured in terms of total cost or capital value) DBFOM and DBOM P3 rail transit projects 
either under construction, or recently completed, in the US.  
Project name Description P3 model Principle partners Capital value, 
revenue and 
financing sources 
Purple Line, 
Washington DC 
26 km light rail 
line in northern 
Washington DC 
DBFOM  Maryland Department 
of Transportation, 
Maryland Transit 
Administration and 
Purple Line Transit 
$5.6 billion including 
$875 million 
Transportation 
Infrastructure Finance 
Innovation Act loan 
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Partners (Meridiam, 
Fluor Enterprises, Star 
America)  
 
from US DOT and $313 
million private activity 
bonds issued by the 
Maryland Economic 
Development 
Corporation 
Hudson-Bergen 
Light Rail, New 
Jersey 
33 km light rail 
running north-
south along the 
Hudson River 
waterfront, New 
Jersey 
DBOM New Jersey Transit, 
21st Century Rail 
Corporation (URS 
Washington Division, 
Itochu Rail Car, 
Kinkisharo USA) 
$2.3 billion including 
FTA full funding grant 
agreements, grant 
anticipation notes and 
State Transportation 
Trust Fund 
Eagle P3, 
Denver, 
Colorado 
37 km light and 
commuter rail 
extension from 
Denver Union 
Station to 
Denver 
International 
Airport plus  
two other short 
extensions to 
Denver area 
suburbs 
DBFOM Denver Regional 
Transportation District 
(RTD), Denver Transit 
Partners (DTP) (Fluor 
Enterprises, Uberior 
Investments and Laing 
Investments) 
$2.2 billion comprised 
of $1 billion federal 
grant, RTD sales tax 
bonds and private equity 
raised by DTP  
Jamaica-JFK 
Airtrain, New 
York 
13 km rail link 
to John F. 
Kennedy (JFK)  
airport 
DBOM  Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey 
(PANYNJ), Skanska/ 
Bombardier 
$1.9 billion including 
Federal Passenger 
Facility Charge revenue 
and capital raised by 
PANYNJ  
 
Table 1: Examples of recent light and commuter rail transit P3 projects in the US with a 
capital value of more than US$1 billion 
Sources: Barrow (2016); Gosling and Freeman (2012); Grisby (2015); RTD FasTracks 
(2015a); US DOT (n.d.). 
 
The US Department of Transportation (USDOT) defines a P3 as a form of 
procurement.  According to the USDOT’s 2004 Report to Congress on Public-Private 
Partnerships,  
“[a] public-private partnership is a contractual agreement formed between public and 
private sector partners, which allows more private sector participation than is 
traditional. The agreements usually involve a government agency contracting with a 
private company to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a facility or 
system.” (Cited in FHWA, 2007: no page nos.)  
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Given such a broad definition, there is considerable scope for a regional public agency to 
negotiate individual P3 arrangements for different projects within its jurisdiction.  Private 
sector financing does not have to be a significant component of the P3 structure, but global 
procurement and financing has nonetheless become more prevalent in recent years.  
 Pension funds have become major sources of global investments in urban 
infrastructure projects worldwide and increasingly in the US too (Clark and Evans, 1998; 
Torrance, 2008). The potential returns and risks associated with such investments are 
arguably much greater than established public financing methods, such as government bonds, 
necessitating the negotiation of formal contracts between parties often lasting more than 
twenty years. However, the negotiation of such contracts can itself be problematic given that 
the performance of investments is not only a function of the knowledge and expertise of 
pension fund managers but also of long-term relations of trust established between investors 
and the owners and operators of the infrastructure facilities in question (Clark and Evans, 
1998). In the US, given the enduring problem of local dependence, access to local knowledge 
and the degree local control of strategic assets are especially controversial features of any 
infrastructure-related contractual agreements.  
 We now examine the Denver Eagle P3 project, which is of international significance 
because it is the first full transit DBFOM in the US and is often cited by transit officials in 
other cities and metropolitan regions as a model for how to finance and deliver regional 
transit extensions (interview, regional transit official, Seattle, April 2017). The remaining 
sections are based on a wider study of transit P3s and regional governance in the Metro 
Denver region undertaken between 2010 and 2017.  
 
Financing mass transit and a crisis of regional provision in Metro Denver  
Since the early 1990s, public officials and business leaders in the Denver Metro 
region have striven to nurture robust institutions of regional collaboration in order to secure 
public support and drive forward public investment in major regional infrastructure and 
economic development projects (Jonas et al., 2014). Investment in the expansion of Denver’s 
mass transit rail system through the FasTracks programme represents the latest in a series of 
voter-approved regional infrastructure projects, which have included the construction of 
Denver International Airport (DIA) in neighbouring Adams County and its annexation to the 
City of Denver in the late 1980s. This section examines the recent history of the FasTracks 
system and sets the context for RTD’s decision to enter into a contract with a GIP3 to 
complete a major extension of the system to DIA. 
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In November 2004, voters in the Denver RTD’s jurisdiction (which includes all or 
part of eight counties and the City of Denver) approved a 0.4 per cent increase in the regional 
sales tax to support the FasTracks programme, a 122-mile extension of Denver’s existing 
light and commuter rail system (Lieb, 2004). FasTracks aimed to expand rail transit into six 
new corridors, including a new link to DIA, extend three existing rail corridor lines and a bus 
rapid transit line to Boulder, and redevelop Denver Union Station into a multimodal 
transportation hub for intercity and regional rail and bus service.  Estimated in 2004 to cost 
$4.7 billion, FasTracks was, at that time, one of the largest urban rail mass transit 
construction projects in the US (Lieb, op. cit.).   
 The FasTracks regional ballot proposal had substantial backing from the metropolitan 
growth coalition comprised of the Metro Denver Chamber of Commerce and the Metro 
Mayors Caucus (MMC). MMC was established in 1993 to operate as a regional mechanism 
for brokering conflicts between the City of Denver and surrounding counties around inward 
investment. Over the ensuing years, the MMC secured significant political compromises 
around a range of controversial regional growth issues arising from land use planning, smart 
growth policies, and the provision of infrastructure (Goetz, 2013; Rusk, 2003). However, 
transportation infrastructure proved a major political challenge due in part to longstanding 
tensions within the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), a multicounty 
planning organisation established in the 1950s. In the 1980s, DRCOG adopted a plan to 
extend rapid transit throughout the Metro Denver region (DRCOG, 2005). However, its 
subsequent efforts to build a regional consensus in support of a rail transit programme failed. 
Nonetheless, the FasTracks initiative was eventually successful, securing 57.2 per cent of the 
regional vote in 2004. Its success has been attributed to MMC’s ability to build a political 
consensus in support of regional economic development projects among member 
municipalities, regional business groups and civic organisations (Katz and Bradley, 2014).  
 Construction delays and escalating costs of materials soon led to a rapid increase in 
the costs of the FasTracks project from US$4.7 billion in 2004 to an estimated $7.8 billion in 
2012. The project’s dire fiscal predicament was exacerbated by a regional economic 
downturn occurring in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-8, which forced RTD to 
revise downwards its projected revenues from the regional sales tax. To offset the projected 
shortfall, some US$397 million in revenue bonds were issued in 2010 to finance the 
FasTracks system. These bonds were given the lowest possible investment grade ratings 
(Baa3 and BBB-) by respective credit rating agencies, which further threatened the financial 
viability of the project (Long, 2012). In its 2011 Annual Report, RTD estimated that 
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FasTracks required an additional $2.7 billion to complete (RTD, 2012: 25).  Nevertheless, 
Denver’s then mayor, John Hickenlooper, remained committed to FasTracks and pushed for 
funding solutions that preserved the integrity of Denver’s regional governance model, which 
he continued to support after becoming Governor of the State of Colorado. 
Given the shortfall in regional funding, extensions to the FasTracks system were not 
likely to be completed within the original twelve-year project timeframe, a factor that 
threatened to fragment regional political consensus around which corridors would be 
constructed and which would be delayed indefinitely (Lieb, 2008). Responding to this 
combined regional fiscal and political crisis, Denver RTD considered shortening the length of 
proposed rail corridors; but this provoked a backlash from public officials and voters in the 
affected jurisdictions, who looked to alternative local funding solutions such as TIF. RTD 
further sought to address the crisis by increasing the construction time of such extensions to 
2034 and proposing additional regional sales tax hikes. Despite support from the MMC, the 
RTD Board rejected sales tax ballot proposals in, respectively, 2010, 2011 and 2012. With 
costs escalating, it had become clear that a regional political solution to the fiscal crisis was 
insufficient. RTD turned to an extra-territorial mechanism to resolve the crisis and bridge the 
funding gap.  
 
Searching for an extra-territorial solution: federal intervention and the GIP3 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-8, state-imposed fiscal austerity 
measures forced many US cities to turn to new P3 arrangements to finance and deliver public 
infrastructure projects (Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011). RTD initially approached the federal 
government for additional funding for FasTracks. In 2007, the Federal Transit Administration 
(FTA) launched its Public Private Partnership Pilot Program (so-called Penta P) to encourage 
US transit agencies to explore how P3s could be set up to mitigate public risk on federally 
funded transportation projects. With the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, 
regional transportation officials in the Denver RTD looked hopefully to the federal 
government to cover the regional funding gap (Lieb, 2008). The Penta P Program offered an 
opportunity to tap into additional federal funding.   
In assembling the Penta P bid, RTD packaged the East rail line to DIA, the Gold line 
to Arvada and Wheat Ridge, and a segment of the Northwest rail line to Westminster into the 
Eagle P3 project. After a bid assessment process, which included submissions from rival 
private consortia, the RTD selected the Denver Transit Partners (DTP) consortium for a 
DBFOM contract to initiate rail service on these lines by 2016, and to operate and maintain 
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the lines for the remainder of the contract. Additional P3s were established with a view to 
completing the remaining components of the FasTracks system.  For example, the plan to 
redevelop Denver’s Union Station – the main hub in the FasTracks system – involved a P3 
arrangement between RTD, DRCOG, the Colorado Department of Transportation, the City 
and County of Denver, and private developers, employing a mixture of local, state and 
federal funding and financing. 
Denver RTD was one of only three regional transportation agencies in the entire US 
selected for the Penta P Program and, as it transpired, it was the only agency able to deliver 
on its original bid proposal. In May of 2011, the FTA awarded a $1.03 billion full-funding 
grant agreement to the RTD for the completion of three major corridors in the Eagle P3 
project. In awarding the money to Denver, the head of the FTA, Peter Rogoff, praised the 
RTD’s plans as a “model of private-sector involvement in transportation” (cited in Lieb, 
2011). A key factor in the FTA’s decision was the RTD’s proposal to set up a new type of P3 
capable of delivering the project in a timely and cost-effective fashion.  
RTD’s preferred project partner was a consortium led by Macquarie Group, and 
included Fluor Enterprises, Ames Construction, and Balfour Beatty Rail, among others 
(RTD, 2009). A global investment bank specialising in financing infrastructure projects 
worldwide, Macquarie was selected at the expense of a rival consortium led by HSBC, 
Siemens, and Veolia Transport. At the time, Macquarie was expanding into the US 
infrastructure market, hoping to capitalize on an emerging market for privatized infrastructure 
assets (Roumeliotis, 2012). For example, it was involved in a $1.7 billion upgrade of a tunnel 
linking the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth in the State of Virginia and had raised a further 
$2 billion to finance its future investments in the US. However, investment returns were 
lower than expected. According to market research conducted by Preqin, private equity 
vehicles that invested in US infrastructure assets raised a total of $16 billion in 2011, which 
was down some forty-nine percent from 2010 (Preqin, 2012, cited in Roumeliotis, 2012). As 
it turned out, Macquarie planned to sell off its stake in the Eagle P3 project well before it was 
completed.  
Macquarie contributed $2 billion in capital towards phase one of the Eagle P3 project, 
of which $54 million was an equity investment, and in return was granted a concession to run 
the commuter rail system upon completion (Long, 2012). The remainder of Macquarie’s 
investment involved construction payments from the RTD. Macquarie promised to complete 
this second phase of the project eleven months ahead of the scheduled deadline in 2016. 
However, further construction delays occurred, in part, due to problems securing rights-of-
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way approvals from private rail freight companies for the use of existing tracks and/or 
corridors (Long, op. cit.). State of Colorado representatives expressed concerns about the 
management of the FasTracks programme and demanded regular audits of RTD accounts.  
Macquarie eventually sold its share in Eagle P3 to Uberior Infrastructure Investments, 
a subsidiary of the Lloyds Banking Group, and Eagle Rail Holdings Inc., a John Laing 
subsidiary. As part of the sale, DTP and the RTD agreed to shorten the length of the 
concession agreement from 46 to 34 years. The new termination date in 2044 reflects a 
predicted need to replace transit rolling stock (Public Works Financing, 2010).  
The major partners in the Eagle P3 consortium are established global players 
experienced with infrastructure projects delivered in countries around the world. DTP’s 
private concessionaires include Fluor Enterprises, Inc., Denver Rail (Eagle) Holdings, which 
is a subdivision of John Laing PLC, and Aberdeen Infrastructure Investments, a unit of 
Aberdeen Global Infrastructure Partners LP (DTP, 2015).  John Laing and Aberdeen 
Infrastructure Investments are the majority partners in DTP, each with a forty-five per cent 
stake (John Laing, 2015).ii  
DTP has since nearly completed the Eagle P3 project, representing three key 
components of the original FasTracks programme (see Figure 1, published version). These 
include the East Rail Line and the Gold Line, which comprise the main East-West extension, 
the first segment of the Northwest Rail Line, and the Commuter Rail Maintenance Facility (a 
site for storing and maintaining the commuter rail vehicles that serve parts of the FasTracks 
system). These extensions connect downtown Denver to major new redevelopment areas 
including the former regional hub airport at Stapletoniii and its replacement, DIA, as well as 
the suburbs of Aurora, Arvada, Wheat Ridge and South Westminster.  The entire project 
represents a significant contribution to Denver’s future aspirations for planned regional 
economic growth (Goetz, 2013). 
  
+++Insert Figure 1 “RTD Eagle P3 Rail Project” about here+++ 
 
While the University of Colorado A lineiv to the airport opened in April 2016, and the 
B line to Westminster opened in July 2016, the G line opening to Arvada and Wheat Ridge 
was delayed until 2018. There have been software problems with the crossing gates that 
caused the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) not to allow testing to continue on the G 
line until the issue is corrected on both the University of Colorado A line and the B line 
(RTD, 2016). The service on the Airport line was also disrupted by several lightning strikes 
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during summer 2016 that shut down the line for up to seven hours at a time (Goetz and 
Boschmann, 2018). These technical problems have called into question some of the design 
and building decisions made by DTP.  RTD had earlier suggested to DTP an alternative 
design to mitigate service interruptions from lightning because it was well known that the 
Denver area is prone to frequent lightning strikes in the summer months.  DTP did not heed 
RTD's advice and did not install the alternative design, citing a force majeur or "act of God" 
claim that the lightning was unforeseeable and thus unavoidable (Aguilar, 2016).  Problems 
with the crossing gates staying down too long have resulted in the FRA requiring human 
guards to be stationed for twenty hours per day at each grade crossing to ensure that impatient 
motorists do not bypass the gates.  The hiring of crossing guards has resulted in additional 
expenses over $6 million thus far for DTP, not including penalties for delays and service 
shortfalls (Aguilar, 2017).       
 
Analysis and discussion: the role of local control and regional collaboration in GIP3 
contractual agreements  
The Denver case study illustrates the growing importance of GIP3s in the landscape 
of urban infrastructure finance and governance in the US.  Notably, the Eagle P3 project 
represents “an innovative financing and project delivery method in which a public entity 
partners with the private sector on a public infrastructure project” (RTD FasTracks, 2015a). 
Indeed, when it first granted the concession, the FTA stipulated that private capital raised for 
the Eagle P3 project had to represent a new kind of P3 model. Given RTD’s historic 
dependence upon regional funding arrangements (a combination of sales taxes, fees and 
bonds), and facing high interest payments, falling sales tax revenues, and a regional public 
unwilling to vote in favour of additional taxes and bond issues, Denver RTD had little choice 
but to adopt a new P3 mechanism to secure federal funding and, with it, a long-term solution 
to the regional funding crisis. This section draws upon the findings of our interview research 
to examine the role of local interests and political conditions in shaping the contractual 
agreement between RTD and the Eagle P3 project consortium. 
 
The question of local control    
Eagle P3 is an example of a DBFOM project, meaning it involves all stages from 
project construction to financing, operation and maintenance (RTD FasTracks, 2015b; c).  Of 
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the more than $2 billion capital commitment, $1.03 billion comprises grant funding from the 
FTA, and the remainder a mixture of public funds and private financing sources (see Table 
2). The RTD makes payments to the private consortium over the lifetime of the project whilst 
retaining ownership of all assets relating to the FasTracks system. DTP will continue to 
operate the project for the remainder of its contracted lifetime.  
 
 
Funding and financing sources 
 
Amount ($US millions) 
Public funding sources:  
 FTA Penta-P new starts grants 1,030 
 RTD dedicated 0.4% FasTracks sales 
tax revenue 
128 
 Other federal grants  57 
 Local city and county government 
contributions 
 
40 
Total funding 
 
1,255 
Financing sources:  
 TIFIA loan through US DOT1 280 
 Tax-exempt private activity bonds 
(PABs)2 
396 
 RTD revenue bond proceeds 57 
 Private equity3 54 
 
Total financing 787 
 
Notes: 
1Financing backed by RTD pledge of revenues from 0.4% FasTracks sales tax and RTD 
original 0.6% sales tax 
2 Repaid by DTP through availability payments from RTD  
3 Returns to concessionaire’s private equity contributions paid through availability 
payments from RTD 
 
Table 2: Funding and financing sources for the Eagle P3 project (data sources: US DOT 
(2015); RTD FasTracks (2015a, 2015c)) 
 
Clark and Evans (1998) provide some context for understanding the relevance of local 
dependence for understanding the interests of the respective parties in such a contractual 
agreement. Amongst other factors, they argue that  
“[t]he fact that many infrastructure facilities have political significance - being the 
symbolic objects in debates about governments’ fiscal and social responsibilities - and 
17 
 
the fact that such facilities are a crucial part of peoples’ everyday lives, suggest that 
another category of uncertainty is the long-term public commitment to the private 
financing of urban infrastructure projects” (Clark and Evans, 1998, p. 308). 
In respect of public commitment, Denver’s Eagle P3 project relies upon local procurement, 
sources of revenue, labour, and, perhaps most important of all, knowledge – all of which 
involved local social relations that have been carefully nurtured over time. The RTD’s history 
of innovative delivery mechanisms played an especially key role in local support for the 
Eagle P3 arrangement. For example, a highway expansion and light rail project in Denver 
known as TREX was conceived in the early 1990s and built in the early 2000s using the then 
novel DB approach. Its success in completing the project ahead of schedule and under budget 
motivated regional officials to pursue similar non-traditional methods of delivering the 
FasTracks project. Nonetheless, not any long-term contractual arrangement would suffice. 
Besides securing a stream of income for the global private consortium, the contract should 
minimize the long-term financial risk for the local public sector, meet the needs of local 
contractors and suppliers, and address any lingering concerns about the loss of local control 
of strategic infrastructure assets held by RTD.  
 Whilst the private consortium is responsible for delivering on a GIP3 contract, the 
assets in question are ultimately owned by a public entity (in this case a regional 
transportation agency) for whom local control is a key consideration (cf. Clark and Evans, op. 
cit., p. 306). Although the RTD has less direct control of the design and building 
specifications of the DBFOM model compared to a design-bid-build contract, one respondent 
speaking on its behalf argued that “I’m sure some people will say the owner has less control. 
I take the view [that] we have plenty of control of the things we should worry about” 
(stakeholder interview, Denver, March 2016). Arguably, the main condition for a robust GIP3 
agreement is guaranteed local cost recovery. Indeed, the FTA full-funding grant agreement 
issued for the Eagle P3 concession awarded points for cost effectiveness, or “bang-for-buck” 
efficiency.  Whilst other P3 arrangements used in the FasTracks programme have delivered 
well below initial cost estimates, the DBFOM structure used for Eagle P3 is proving to be the 
most cost-effective, costing $300 million below initial internal estimates. Savings have come 
from extending the period of financing and accelerating the delivery of the FasTracks system, 
enabling RTD to allocate funds to other regional transportation projects in Denver (interviews 
with stakeholders, Denver, March 2016). In fact, stakeholders rate the project as financially 
the most effective P3 arrangement used in Metro Denver because of the improved access to 
the airport and the prospect of attracting new development to Adams County.v In addition, the 
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Eagle P3 project has circumvented the need to return to the regional ballot box to leverage 
extra revenues.  
 
Preserving the integrity of collaborative regional governance 
Another theme arising from our interview-based research is the implications of the 
RTD’s contractual agreement with DTP for the long-term integrity of Denver’s model of 
regional collaboration, which hitherto has striven to build trust and political consensus 
between business organisations, voters and local governments around potentially 
controversial regional funding issues. Most of our respondents agree that RTD has – with one 
or two notable exceptions such as the aforementioned crossing gate issue – been able to 
extract substantial concessions from the private consortium in return for regional support for 
the financing deal. “There is a fairly significant and substantial appetite for long-term fairly 
manageable risk, fairly predictable returns, and from a financial standpoint for the 
concessionaire [DTP], it’s good. Is it a smoking deal? I don’t know. Is it a bad deal? No. But 
it’s a good deal” (stakeholder interview, Denver, March 2016). A key factor was RTD’s 
ability to stipulate output specifications, enabling it to impose penalties on the consortium if 
it did not deliver all or part of the project. In the event, the consortium has incurred 
significant additional expenses, such as having to demolish and rebuild the Jersey Cutoff 
bridge at the cost of $10 million due to a flawed initial design,vi and over $6 million for the 
crossing gate problems thus far (Aguilar, 2017).  
Previous research suggests that over-reliance upon P3s fosters concerns about the loss 
of public accountability when the private sector takes over the operation of a major public 
asset such as a regional transit system (Siemiatycki, 2006).  Our findings, however, suggest 
that such concerns can shape contractual agreements from the outset. By their nature, P3s are 
“…super complex and super opaque…. It’s just complicated, and I think … if 
[someone has] a reason for [a P3 project] not to go forward, it’s easy to sort of scare 
people about what you’re delegating and outsourcing, that there is this big powerful, 
probably not local, consortium coming to, you know, do this thing, and so I still think 
[P3s] are a little vulnerable in that respect because they aren’t transactions most 
people are going to understand” (stakeholder interview, Denver, March 2016).  
Nonetheless participants in contract negotiations found it a challenge to explain P3s to 
Denver voters, many of whom are unfamiliar with the underlying complexity of such 
financing arrangements.  
19 
 
“I think the blame lies with the industry and the owners. We haven’t done a good job 
of educating people about a really complex topic…. so if we want to be doing billion 
dollar transactions, we should probably invest a little more time and effort educating 
stakeholders appropriately” (stakeholder interview, Denver, July 2016).   
It is further acknowledged that public and private partners involved in a large and extremely 
complicated GIP3 contract need to invest time and resources into public information 
campaigns in order to ease public suspicions about privately-financed infrastructure projects. 
Such concerns are justified insofar as a GIP3 project involves significant up-front costs. 
On the question of whether GIP3s are more cost-effective than traditional P3 
arrangements, our research found that stakeholders are worried that the financial risks 
associated with a badly structured contract greatly outweigh the up-front costs of hiring 
experts, including lawyers, designers, bankers and public relations personnel. In the absence 
of standardised contracts for full DBFOM agreements, the Denver RTD hired financial and 
legal experts from global firms, including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Freshfields to 
prepare the bid and negotiate terms of the consortium agreement. Nonetheless stakeholders 
acknowledged that reliance upon a P3 delivery model does come with extra costs:   
“We [the public agency] are able to secure financing at a far better rate than what our 
private partners can. … If you go down the hall, to the green-visor wearing accountant 
that is looking at [the interest rates and financing], the public agency accountant or 
CFO [Chief Financial Officer] is rarely going to be a chief supporter of P3s because 
they will always look at the sole financing of that portion and say, ‘well you guys are 
still taking out this loan for x dollars, and you are paying a higher rate than what we 
could get ourselves. Why are you doing this?’ So that’s where taking a look at some 
of the other benefits […] really come in as far as the value, the net present value of 
this particular delivery mechanism” (stakeholder interview, Denver, March 2016).  
So the true value of the contract should, it is suggested, take into consideration the allocation 
of risk between the public and private sectors and the capability to build the rail lines faster. 
In addition, in the case of the RTD, using a P3 structure that included operations and 
maintenance spread out payments over a longer period of time, freeing up more money for 
additional FasTrack projects, and avoiding future funding “bottlenecks” (RTD, 2015). 
Efforts to bring on board the public and preserve the integrity of Metro Denver’s 
approach to regional collaboration have in the end proven crucial not only for managing 
tensions around the financing of the Eagle P3 project but also for delivering other P3 projects 
across the region. Denver RTD’s ability to complete or begin construction on projects, such 
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as the I-225 and North Metro lines, using savings from Eagle P3 was, in the words of one 
interviewee, deemed  
“…. brilliant, especially along North Metro. You had such anti-Denver and anti-RTD 
rhetoric that was coming out of Adams County and those North Metro communities, 
that actually figuring out how to give them a chunk of the North Metro rail line and 
hold out a real hope to get the rest of it built was extremely important” (stakeholder 
interview, Denver, July 2016).  
For some, it demonstrated a “good-faith effort” on the part of Denver to get something built 
for neighbouring jurisdictions such as Adams County and the City of Aurora. “It held 
together the broader regional coalition around transit that I think otherwise would have turned 
into another half-dozen factions all trying to grab the money” (stakeholder interview, Denver, 
July, 2016). Nonetheless, Denver’s model of regional collaboration remains threatened by a 
pervasive “corridor versus corridor” mentality that has resulted from the fragmentation of the 
FasTracks system into separate P3 governance arrangements. This is especially true for the 
unfinished Northwest Corridor rail line to Boulder and Longmont. Although FasTracks was 
originally designed and funded as an integral regional transportation system, it is now in 
effect financed and delivered on a corridor-by-corridor basis. Whilst the system could not 
have been funded and financed in the absence of regional collaboration, nonetheless its 
completion has exposed tensions in Denver’s collaborative approach to regional 
development.  
 
Conclusions and wider implications 
This study has examined the context and circumstances in which public authorities in 
the Metro Denver region turned to an extra-territorial mechanism for financing extensions to 
regional transit infrastructure. We have shown how additional regional funding arrangements 
proved necessary but ultimately insufficient solutions to the escalating costs of planned 
extensions to the FasTracks rail transit system, which had been approved by the region’s 
voters in 2004. In order to complete the Eagle P3 project – a major component of the 
FasTracks system and one of the largest transit P3 ventures in recent US history – Denver 
RTD looked to a GIP3 to procure the necessary additional resources and raise capital from 
global private equity investments. This novel global infrastructure financing mechanism, in 
turn, provided Denver RTD with access to additional federal funding enabling it to complete 
significant components of the original FasTracks system.  
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The findings of the paper have several wider research implications. First, Denver’s 
Eagle P3 project is increasingly regarded to be a model for the new generation of 
transportation P3s in the US. As other cities and metropolitan regions look to innovative 
ways of financing major extensions to existing regional transit systems, many are turning to a 
new generation of GIP3 financing arrangements, making this study a timely and potentially 
significant benchmark for further research. Yet despite the novelty of such global 
arrangements, our analysis suggests that the enduring problem of local dependence – a 
reliance on the part of metropolitan growth coalition interests, broadly conceived, on local 
funding, knowledge and collaborative models of regional governance to deliver region-wide 
investments in infrastructure –  remains a significant factor shaping contractual relations 
between a GIP3 and a regional transportation agency.  
Second, further research is needed on the role of local political conditions in shaping 
contractual agreements negotiated between a regional public agency and a GIP3 consortium. 
The GIP3 model relies upon income extracted from fixed equity-based regional 
transportation infrastructure investments and assets. In the US, such investments are 
organized, operated and funded locally for the most part and, as such, are bound to a 
particular territory – in this case, a metropolitan region and its attendant flows of materials, 
people and capital. As Harvey (1982) argued many years ago, place-based infrastructure 
assets are always vulnerable to devaluation. Accordingly, potential investors tend to target 
territories where there is “a level of political stability and visibility on government 
infrastructure procurement policy” (cited in Caon, 2014). Denver’s Eagle P3 project was 
attractive to a GIP3 because it not only relied on already-approved regional sales tax funding 
and newly-secured funding from the US federal government but also fiscally benefited from 
Denver’s mature political climate of regional collaboration.   
Third, there is a need for further research into the role of GIP3s in supporting or, 
conversely, undermining models of regional collaborative governance.  Across many cities 
and regions, new multi-jurisdictional regional collaborative agreements between local and 
national governments, metropolitan growth coalitions and special purpose districts have 
emerged to deliver ambitious regional economic development and infrastructure projects 
(Wachsmuth, 2015). Although initially successful in raising regional taxes to fund the 
FasTracks system, such arrangements in Metro Denver ultimately proved insufficient for 
resolving an extended crisis in the funding of transit infrastructure. Extra-territorial 
intervention in the form of a contractual agreement between the regional transit district and a 
GIP3 was required to complete the FasTracks system. This solution was actively encouraged 
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by a national transportation administration committed to aligning new P3 arrangements with 
collaborative regional governance, suggesting that such extra-territorial mechanisms are 
increasingly likely to shape future investment in regional transport infrastructure in countries, 
such as the US, whose governments remain ideologically and politically committed to P3 
financing models.     
Fourth, and finally, the paper has identified the emergence of the GIP3 as a potentially 
powerful new player in the territorial politics of collective infrastructure provision. The US 
context is especially significant given the enduring metropolitan fiscal disparity problem. The 
intense global competition to attract private finance to public infrastructure projects creates 
opportunities for metropolitan growth coalitions to exploit the problem in novel ways. On the 
one hand, the prospect of attracting a GIP3 might embolden members of a local growth 
coalition to seek to appease local public opposition to extra taxes by promising to transfer 
short-term risk to the private sector in exchange for socialising the costs of infrastructure over 
the longer-term (cf. Graham and Marvin, 2001). On the other hand, poorer local jurisdictions 
and their constituencies – those lacking the political and economic capacity to secure 
premium access to regional infrastructure – will in all likelihood continue to experience local 
deficits in collective provision (see Keil and Adie, 2005). This in itself need not necessarily 
expose regional officials and politicians to undue public criticism. As Storper (2013) argues, 
the metropolitan fiscal disparity problem can be managed by fostering stronger institutional 
bonds at the regional scale. One might even argue that the negotiation of more robust 
arrangements between regional political actors and a GIP3 could ensure a more equitable 
provision of infrastructure in the medium-to-long term.  
But is the fostering of stronger mechanisms of regional collaboration always a 
sufficient condition? What happens, for example, when unanticipated costs associated with 
large-scale infrastructure projects escalate and regional collaborative arrangements fail to 
internalise such costs? To what extent does the presence of a GIP3 change the balance of 
power between public and private sector interests across a region? Or between a region and 
its national or global competitors? Crucially, how can the regional public interest be protected 
when a GIP3 project fails? As officials in other cities and metropolitan regions look 
increasingly to extra-territorial solutions to the regional crisis of infrastructure provision, 
finding answers to such questions necessitates further research on contractual agreements 
involving GIP3s. 
 
Notes 
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1. For further details about the methods used in this study, see XXX [to be inserted].  
2. Other members of the Eagle P3 consortium are global contractors, including Balfour 
Beatty Rail Inc. and Ames Construction. 
3. The area of the former Stapleton airport has been redeveloped into a New Urbanist-
style community with over 16,000 residents as of 2014. 
3.  The University of Colorado acquired naming rights for the commuter rail line to DIA 
as part of a five-year, $5 million deal with the RTD signed in August 2015. See: 
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/04/19/why-the-train-to-denver-international-airport-is-
named-the-university-of-colorado-a-line/  (accessed 15 December, 2016). 
4. Denver’s current mayor, Michael Hancock, has expressed an interest in developing 
the land around DIA and along the A-line corridor into an ‘aerotropolis’ or airport city as an 
engine for regional economic development. 
5. This bridge crosses heavily used freight railroad tracks just south of I-70 along the 
Gold line/Northwest line alignment in the Eagle P3 project.  
 
Funding 
To be included. 
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